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The world and most regions and countries are experiencing unprecedentedly rapid demographic
change. The most obvious example of this change is the huge expansion of human numbers:
four billion have been added since 1950. Projections for the next half century expect a highly diver-
gent world, with stagnation or potential decline in parts of the developed world and continued rapid
growth in the least developed regions. Other demographic processes are also undergoing extraordi-
nary change: women’s fertility has dropped rapidly and life expectancy has risen to new highs. Past
trends in fertility and mortality have led to very young populations in high fertility countries in the
developing world and to increasingly older populations in the developed world. Contemporary
societies are now at very different stages of their demographic transitions. This paper summarizes
key trends in population size, fertility and mortality, and age structures during these transitions.
The focus is on the century from 1950 to 2050, which covers the period of most rapid global
demographic transformation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
After centuries of very slow and uneven growth, the
world population reached one billion in 1800. The
modern expansion of human numbers started then,
rising at a slow but more steady pace over the next
150 years to 2.5 billion in 1950. During the second
half of the twentieth century, however, growth rates
accelerated to historically unprecedented levels. As a
result, world population more than doubled to 6.5
billion in 2005 (United Nations 1962, 1973, 2007).
This population expansion is expected to continue
for several more decades before peaking near 10 billion
later in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Around 2070, the
world’s population will be 10 times larger than
in 1800.
The recent period of very rapid demographic
change in most countries around the world is charac-
teristic of the central phases of a secular process
called the demographic transition. Over the course of
this transition, declines in birth rates followed by
declines in death rates bring about an era of rapid
population growth. This transition usually accompa-
nies the development process that transforms an
agricultural society into an industrial one. Before the
transition’s onset, population growth (which equals
the difference between the birth and death rate in
the absence of migration) is near zero as high death
rates more or less offset the high birth rates typical of
agrarian societies before the industrial revolution.
Population growth is again near zero after the com-
pletion of the transition as birth and death rates both
reach low levels in the most developed societies.
During the intervening transition period, rapid demo-
graphic change occurs, characterized by two distinct
phases. During the ﬁrst phase, the population
growth rate rises as the death rate declines while the
birth rate remains high. In the second phase, the
growth rate declines (but remains positive) due to a
decline in the birth rate. The entire transition typically
takes more than a century to complete and ends with a
much larger population size.
The plot of world population size over time in
ﬁgure 1 (top solid line) shows the typical S-shaped
pattern of estimated and projected population size
over the course of the transition. Population growth
accelerated for most of the twentieth century reaching
the transition’s midpoint in the 1980s and has recently
begun to decelerate slightly. Today, we are still on the
steepest part of this growth curve with additions to
world population exceeding 75 million per year
between 1971 and 2016.
Contemporary societies are at very different stages
of their demographic transitions. Key trends in
population size, fertility and mortality during these
transitions are summarized below. The focus is on
the century from 1950 to 2050, covering the period
of most rapid global demographic change. The main
source of data is the United Nation’s 2006 world
population assessment, which provides estimates for
1950–2005 and projections from 2005 to 2050
(United Nations 2007).
2. FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS
The projected rise in world population to 9.2 billion in
2050 represents an increase of 2.7 billion over the 2005
populationof6.5billion.Nearlyallofthisfuturegrowth
will occur in the ‘South’—i.e. Africa, Asia (excluding
Japan, Australia and New Zealand), and Latin
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from5.3to7.9billionbetween2005and2050(table1).
In contrast, in the ‘North’ (Europe, Northern America,
Japan and Australia/New Zealand), population size is
forecast to remain virtually stable, growing slightly
from 1.22 to 1.25 billion between 2005 and 2050.
The difference in trends between these two world
regions reﬂects the later stage of the transition in the
North compared with the South.
The global demographic transition began in the nine-
teenth century in the now economically developed parts
of the world (the North) with declines in death rates.
Large reductions in birth rates followed in the early
part of the twentieth century. These transitions are now
more or less complete. But, as shown in table 1,t r e n d s
for the two principal regions in the North are expected
to diverge between 2005 and 2050: an increase from
0.33 to 0.45 billion in Northern America, and a decline
from 0.73 to 0.66 billion in Europe. In fact, several
countries in Europe (e.g. Russia) and East Asia (e.g.
Japan) face signiﬁcant population declines as birth rates
have fallen below death rates.
The demographic transitions in Africa, Asia and
Latin America started later and are still underway. In
2005, Asia had a population of 3.94 billion, more
than half of the world total, and its population is
expected to grow by 34 per cent to 5.27 billion by
2050. Africa, with 0.92 billion inhabitants in 2005, is
likely to experience by far the most rapid relative
expansion, more than doubling to 2.0 billion by
2050. Latin America, with 0.56 billion in 2005, is
the smallest of the regions of the South; its projected
growth trend is similar to that of Asia.
It may seem surprising that population growth
continues at a rapid pace in sub-Saharan Africa,
where the AIDS epidemic is most severe. This epi-
demic has indeed caused many deaths, but population
growth continues because the epidemic is no longer
expanding and the birth rate is expected to remain
higher than the elevated death rate in the future
(UNAIDS 2007; Bongaarts et al. 2008). The
epidemic’s demographic impact can be assessed by
comparing the standard UN population projection
(which includes the epidemic’s effect) with a separate
hypothetical projection in which AIDS mortality is
excluded (United Nations 2007). In sub-Saharan
Africa, the former projects a 2050 population of 1.76
billion and the latter a population of 1.95 billion.
The difference of 0.2 billion in 2050 between these
projections with and without the epidemic is due to
deaths from AIDS as well as the absence of the descen-
dents from people who died from AIDS. According to
these projections, the population of sub-Saharan
Africa will grow by one billion between 2005 and
2050 despite the substantial impact of the AIDS
epidemic. In fact, no country is expected to see a
decline in its population size between 2005 and 2050
due to high AIDS mortality. Most populations in
sub-Saharan Africa will more than double in size,
several will triple and Niger is expected to quadruple
by 2050 (United Nations 2007).
Transitions in the developing world have generally
produced more rapid population growth rates in
mid-transition than historically observed in the
North. In some developing countries (e.g. Kenya and
Uganda), peak growth rates approached four per
cent per year in recent decades (implying a doubling
of population size in two decades), levels that were
very rarely observed in developed countries except
with massive immigration. Two factors account for
this very rapid expansion of population in these still
largely traditional societies: the spread of medical
technology (e.g. immunization, antibiotics) after
World War II, which led to extremely rapid declines
in death rates, and a lag in declines in birth rates.
Population sizes for the 10 largest countries in 2005
and in 2050 are presented in table 2. In 2005, China
(1.31 billion) and India (1.13 billion) were by far the
largest countries, together accounting for nearly half
theSouth’stotal.Thetop10includesixAsiancountries
and onlyone countryeach in LatinAmerica and Africa.
By 2050, the ranking is expected to have shifted
substantially, with India’s population exceeding
China’s, and with Ethiopia and DR Congo rising to
the top 10, replacing Japan and the Russian Federation.
To simplify the presentation of results, all projec-
tions discussed in this study are taken from the
medium variant of the UN projections (United
Nations 2007). The UN has a good record of
making relatively accurate projections (National
Research Council 2000), but the future is of course
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Figure 1. Population size estimates, 1900–2005 and
projections 2005–2050. High, medium and low variants.
Table 1. Population estimates (1950–2005) and projections
(2005–2050), by region. Adapted from United Nations
(2007).
population
(billions) % increase
1950 2005 2050
1950–
2005
2005–
2050
Africa 0.22 0.92 2.00 311 117
Sub-Saharan 0.18 0.77 1.76 327 129
Asia 1.41 3.94 5.27 179 34
Latin America 0.17 0.56 0.77 233 38
Europe 0.55 0.73 0.66 33 29
Northern
America
0.17 0.33 0.45 94 34
South 1.72 5.30 7.95 208 50
North 0.81 1.22 1.25 49 2
World 2.54 6.51 9.19 157 41
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half century will likely diverge to some extent from
current projections. The UN makes an effort to
capture this uncertainty by publishing separate high
and low projections. For the world, the high and low
variants reach 7.8 and 10.8 billion, respectively, in
2050, indicating a rather wide range of possible
outcomes (see dashed lines in ﬁgure 1).
3. DRIVERS OF POPULATION GROWTH:
FERTILITY AND MORTALITY
The world’s population increases every year because
the global birth rate exceeds the death rate. For
example, in 2000–2005 population size increased at
a rate of 1.17 per cent per year, which equals the
difference between a birth rate of 2.03 per cent and
a death rate of 0.86 per cent. At the country level,
population growth is also affected by migration, but
for the regional aggregates of population used in this
analysis, migration is usually a minor factor, and it
will therefore not be discussed in detail.
The annual birth and death rates of populations are
in turn primarily determined by levels of fertility and
mortality experienced by individuals. The most
widely used fertility indicator is the total fertility rate
(TFR), which equals the number of births a woman
would have by the end of her reproductive years if
she experienced the age-speciﬁc fertility rates prevail-
ing in a given year. Mortality is often measured by
the life expectancy (LE) at birth, which equals the
average number of years a newborn would live if
subjected to age-speciﬁc mortality rates observed in a
given year.
(a) Fertility
The UN’s past estimates and future projections of
fertility levels by region for the period 1950–2050
are presented in ﬁgure 2. In the 1950s, the TFR in
the South was high and virtually stable at around six
births per woman on average. This high level of ferti-
lity reﬂects a near absence of birth control, a condition
that has prevailed for centuries before the middle of
the twentieth century. In the late 1960s, a rapid
decline in fertility started nearly simultaneously in
Asia and Latin America. In contrast, Africa has experi-
enced only limited reproductive change. As a result of
these divergent past trends, fertility levels in 2000–
2005 differed widely among regions from as high as
5 births per woman (bpw) in Africa, to 2.5 bpw in
Asia and Latin America. Average fertility in the
North was already low in the early 1950s and has
since declined to 2.0 bpw in Northern America and
to 1.4 bpw in Europe.
The decline in the average fertility in the South
from 6 to 3 bpw over the past half century has been
very rapid by historical standards. This reproductive
revolution is mainly due to two factors. First, desired
family size of parents has declined as the cost of chil-
dren rose and child survival increased. Second,
government intervention played a key role. In China
this took the form of a coercive and unpopular
one-child policy, but most other countries
implemented voluntary family planning programmes.
The aim of these programmes is to provide infor-
mation about and access to contraceptives at
subsidized prices so that women who want to limit
their childbearing can more readily do so.
UN projections for the South assume that the TFR
will eventually reach and then fall slightly below the
so-called ‘replacement’ level in all regions. Replace-
ment fertility is just above 2 bpw and it represents
the level at which each generation just replaces the
previous one, thus leading to zero population growth
(in the absence of mortality change and migration).
Below-replacement fertility produces, in the long
run, population decline. As is evident from ﬁgure 2,
the TFRs in Asia and Latin America are expected to
reach the replacement level around 2020. Africa
is assumed to be on a much slower trajectory
towards replacement fertility because of its lower
level of socio-economic development. High fertility
therefore remains a key cause of future population
growth in this region. In contrast, the already low
fertility of the North is expected to remain below
replacement and is no longer driving population
growth.
Table 2. Ten largest countries by population size in 1995
(estimate) and 2050 (medium projection). Adapted from
United Nations (2007).
rank
1995 2050
country
population
size
(millions) country
projected
population
(millions)
1 China 1313 India 165
2 India 1134 China 140
3 United
States
300 United
States
40
4 Indonesia 226 Indonesia 29
5 Brazil 187 Pakistan 29
6 Pakistan 158 Nigeria 28
7 Bangladesh 153 Brazil 25
8 Russian
Federation
144 Bangladesh 25
9 Nigeria 141 D.R.
Congo
18
10 Japan 128 Ethiopia 18
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Figure 2. Trends in the total fertility rate by region.
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Mortality levels have also changed rapidly over the past
several decades (ﬁgure 3). The South experienced
exceptional improvements in LE from an average of
41 years in 1950–1955 to 64 years in 2000–2005. By
the early 2000, Latin America reached mortality levels
similar to those prevailing in the North in the 1970s,
and Asiawas just a few years behind. Africa experienced
the highest mortality and improvements in LE stalled in
the1990sduetotheAIDSepidemic.Asaresult,Africa’s
LE, at 52 years in 2000–2005, was still substantially
below that of Asia (68) and Latin America (72). As
expected, Europe and Northern America already
achieved relatively low levels of mortality by 1950, but
they have nevertheless seen signiﬁcant further improve-
ments since then. Europe’s LE (74) is now lower than
North America’s (78) because of a rise in mortality in
Eastern Europe after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Projections of future LEs by the UN assume contin-
ued improvements over time in all regions. The North
is expected to reach 82 years in 2050 despite the
increasing difﬁculty in achieving increments as
countries reach ever higher levels of LE. Asia and
Latin America are expected to continue to close the
gap with the North, and Africa will continue to lag,
in part because the continent remains affected by the
AIDS epidemic.
It should be noted that the assumptions made by
the UN about future trends in fertility and mortality
are not based on a ﬁrm theoretical basis. Instead, the
UN relies on empirical regularities in past trends in
countries that have completed their transitions,
mostly in the North, where fertility declined to
approximately the replacement level, and increases in
LE became smaller over time. This is a plausible
approach that unfortunately leaves room for potential
inaccuracies in projection results.
4. CHANGING POPULATION AGE
COMPOSITION
Over the course of the demographic transition, declines
in fertility and mortality cause important changes in a
population’s age composition. In general, countries in
the early stages of the transition have a younger age
structure than countries in the later stages.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the 2005
population in four broad age groups: 0–14, 15–24,
25–64 and 65þ by region. Most of the regions in
the South—Africa, Latin America, South Asia and
West Asia—have very young age structures with
about half of the population under age 25 (62% in
Africa). The exception is East Asia (mostly China)
where this proportion is 37 per cent. In the North,
the population under 25 is still smaller: 35 per cent
in North America and just 30 per cent in Europe.
The reverse pattern is observed for the proportion
65þ, which is much higher in the North than in the
South, ranging from as high as 15 per cent in
Europe to as low as just 3 per cent in Africa.
(a) The age-dependency ratio
A changing age distribution has signiﬁcant social and
economic consequences, e.g. for the allocation of
education, healthcare and social security resources to
the young and old. Assessments of this impact often
rely on the so-called age-dependency ratio (DR) that
summarizes key changes in the age structure. The
DR at a given point in time equals the ratio of popu-
lation aged below 15 and over 65 to the population
of age 15–64. This ratio aims to measure how many
‘dependents’ there are for each person in the
‘productive’ age group. Obviously, not every person
below 15 and over 65 is a dependent and not every
person between ages 15 and 65 is productive. Despite
its crudeness, this indicator is widely used to
document broad trends in the age composition.
Over the course of a demographic transition, the
DR shows a characteristic pattern of change.
Figure 5 presents this pattern as observed in the
South from 1950 to 2005 and projected from 2005
to 2050. Early in the transition, the DR typically ﬁrst
rises slightly as improvements in survival chances of
children raise the number of young people. Next, the
DR falls sharply as declines in fertility reduce the
proportion of the population under age 15. This
decline has important economic consequences
because it creates a so-called ‘demographic dividend’,
which boosts economic growth by increasing the
size of the labour force relative to dependents and
by stimulating savings (Birdsall et al. 2001). Finally,
at the end of the transition, the DR increases again
as the proportion of the population over age 65 rises.
Figure 5 also plots the DR of the North from
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decline, but after 2010 it rises steeply as very low
fertility and increasing longevity increases the
proportion 65þ. This ageing of the North poses
serious challenges to support systems for the elderly
(OECD 1998, 2001).
(b) Population momentum
At the end of the demographic transition natural
population growth reaches zero once three conditions
are met:
(i) Fertility levels-off at the replacement level of
about 2.1 bpw (more precisely, the net
reproduction rate should be 1). If fertility
remains above replacement, population growth
continues.
(ii) Mortality stops declining. In practice, this is not
likely to happen because improvements in
medical technology and healthcare as well as
changes in lifestyles, etc. will probably ensure
continued increases in LE.
(iii) The age structure has adjusted to the
post-transitional levels of fertility and mortality.
The adjustment of the age structure at the end of the
transition takes many decades to complete. A key
implication of this slow adjustment process is that
population growth continues for many years after
replacement fertility is reached if, as is often the
case, the population is still relatively young when ferti-
lity reaches the replacement level. The tendency of
population size to increase after a two-child family
size has been reached is referred to as population
momentum; it is the consequence of a young population
age structure (‘young’ is deﬁned relative to the age
structure in the current life table) (Bongaarts &
Bulatao 1999).
The population momentum inherent in the age
structure of a particular population at a given point
in time can be estimated with a hypothetical popu-
lation projection in which future fertility is set instantly
to the replacement level, mortality is held constant and
migration is set to zero. Since such a variant is not
directly available from UN projections, it will not be
presented here. However, the UN does provide
‘instant replacement’ projections in which mortality
and migration trends are the same as in the standard
projection. This projection gives an approximation of
the combined effect on future growth of population
momentum and declining mortality in the South
because the role of migration is small. The difference
between this hypothetical projection and the standard
medium UN projection is a measure of the impact of
high fertility on future population growth.
Results of these two projections are presented in
ﬁgure 6, which compares the per cent growth between
2005 and 2050 for regions in the South. The black
bars give the growth in the standard (medium variant)
projection and the grey bars give the growth in the
‘instantreplacement’projection.Threeresultsarenote-
worthy. First, the two projections differ most in Africa
(þ117% versus þ50%) which is as expected because
fertility is still very high in this region. Second, in all
regions of the South outside China, populations
would be expected to rise by 50 per cent (62% in West
Asia) if fertility were set to replacement in 2005. This
implies that momentum and declining mortality are
responsible for nearly half of the projected future popu-
lation growth in Africa and for the large majority of
growth in Latin America, and South and West Asia.
Third, in East Asia and in Latin America the
replacement projection exceeds the medium UN
projection. This ﬁnding is explained by the fact that
fertility in these regions is assumed to average below
the replacement level over the next half century.
5. CONCLUSION
The world and most countries are going through a
period of unprecedentedly rapid demographic
change. The most obvious example of this change is
the huge expansion of human numbers: four billion
have been added since 1950. Other demographic pro-
cesses are also experiencing extraordinary change:
women are having fewer births and LEs have risen to
new highs. Past trends in fertility and/or mortality
have led to very young populations in high fertility
countries in the South and to increasingly older
populations in the North. Still other important
demographic changes which were not reviewed here
include rapid urbanization, international migration,
and changes in family and household structure.
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reaching around 9.2 billion in 2050 and peaking still
higher later in the century. The demographic drivers
of this growth are high fertility in parts of the South,
as well as declining mortality and momentum. This
large expansion in human numbers and of the accom-
panying changes in the age structure will have multiple
consequences for society, the economy and the
environment as discussed in the subsequent chapters
in this issue.
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